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Prime Minister Sitiveni Ligamada
Rabuka made a startling, if
refreshingly accurate, observation
about the situation in Fiji during a state
visit to New Zealand in April 1993.
"Some of us have been going around
the world saying that everything is nice
in Fiji. It is not," he said. "We have to
accept that" (FT, 2 Apr 1993): The year
1993 was not a very nice one for
Rabuka and his government. Dogged
by one scandal after another, its back-
benchers threatening rebellion, its poli-
cies for effective national government
marred by resurgent provincialism, the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
government finally met its end in
November when the budget was
defeated in Parliament. It was forced to
resign after only eighteen months in
office. The country began to prepare
for the next general elections, due to be
held in mid-February 1994. The year
ended on a note of confusion and dis-
array.
There was other unhappy news dur-
ing the year as well. Siddiq Moiddin
Koya, a founding member of the
National Federation Party, its longtime
controversial leader, a leading criminal
lawyer, and a chest-thumping orator
who had played a conciliatory role in
Fiji's transition to independence in
1970, died of a heart attack in April.
Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau died in
December from leukemia. He was the
Tui Cakau, paramount chief of the
Tovata confederacy, longtime Alliance
minister and deputy prime minister,
Fiji's second governor general, and,
after the 1987 coups, the republic's first
president. The Great Council of Chiefs
swiftly elevated first vice president (and
longtime Alliance prime minister) Ratu
Sir Kamisese Mara to the presidency.
Mara's unsurprising ascendancy
caused much disquiet in Rabuka's
camp. Mara has a well-known and
highly developed disregard for
Rabuka. His own preferred successor
as prime minister was Josefata Kami-
kamica, Rabuka's arch political rival.
The relationship between the two men
will be watched with great interest in
1994·
For all its problems, 1993 began on a
hopeful note, with talks continuing on
a possible government of national
unity. Rabuka, who had sprung the
idea in Parliament late in 1992 without
consulting his own party or the Great
Council of Chiefs, was vague about
what exactly he meant. His proposal
was littered with unexceptionable
statements, including the perceived
need to "develop a social and political
partnership that transcends suspicion
and distrust, that elevates us as a
nation and gives us a combined sense
of common destiny and purpose" (Fiji
1993). However, a few months earlier,
he had stated categorically that accept-
ance of the principle of the para-
mountcy of Fijian interests was a pre-
condition for national unity. Initially,
Rabuka's critics were skeptical, seeing
his unity proposal as a tactic to divert
POLITICAL REVIEWS 439
attention away from his manifold
political problems. Indo-Fijian leaders
Jai Ram Reddy of the National Federa-
tion Party and Mahendra Chaudhary
of the Fiji Labour Party were skeptical.
They wanted the government's com-
mitment to certain principles of power-
sharing that were just and fair to all
communities in Fiji. Nonetheless, they
agreed to join Rabuka in informal dis-
cussion of his proposal.
The talks faltered because of the
vagueness of the concept, as well as
opposition from powerful Fijian
groups. Ratu Mara, whose blessing
was clearly critical, said publicly that
a government of national unity would
not work under the terms of the 1990
constitution. Mara's caution was
echoed by his proteges, including Jose-
fata Kamikamica and Finau Taba-
kaucoro (FT, 15 Feb 1993). Rabuka's
own cabinet was unenthusiastic and
relegated the proposal to a long-term
objective. The Great Council of Chiefs
listened politely to the proposals in
May, but avoided taking a stand by
asking the government to ascertain the
feelings of ordinary Fijians through the
machinery of provincial administra-
tion.
With the unity proposal languishing
in the provinces, Rabuka shifted gear
and began preparing the ground for his
promised review of the constitution.
He set up a cabinet subcommittee
chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
Filipe Bole. The committee was subse-
quently expanded to include four mem-
bers of the Opposition headed by Jai
Ram Reddy, and met twice during the
middle of the year. The first of its three
tasks was "to develop further, and to
try to reach a broad consensus on, a set
of fundamental principles which is to
be the basis of mutual co-existence in
Fiji as a unitary but multi-racial and
multi-religious state." Second, it was to
devise the draft terms of reference for
the proposed parliamentary select com-
mittee on the constitution. The final
task was to look at other models of
government "considered appropriate
for Fiji in terms of promoting unity and
harmony among all its communities,
and their equitable representation and
participation in the political leadership
of the country, both in Parliament and
in government" (Reddy 1993). The rec-
ommendations of the committee were
to be submitted to an independent con-
stitutional commission. The talks were
followed quietly in the media, raising
hopes for a peaceful resolution of vari-
ous issues surrounding the review of
the constitution. As it happened, all
this work was put in abeyance with the
defeat of the Rabuka government.
The Fiji Labour Party did not partic-
ipate in the discussions on the constitu-
tion. It had withdrawn its support for
Rabuka and walked out of Parliament
in June to protest his failure to act on
promises to them a year earlier (Lal
1993). These included an immediate
review of the constitution, repeal of the
10 percent value-added tax on most
consumer items and of the labor
reforms, and consultations on the Agri-
cultural Landlord and Tenants Act.
Rabuka's rebuff placed the Fiji Labour
Party in a precarious position, since
they had nothing to show for support-
ing his bid to become prime minister.
The results of a by-election in the
Indian constituency of Rewa-Naitasiri
underscored Labour's predicament. In
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a fiercely contested battle, the National
Federation Party's Aptar Singh won
handily over Labour's Ramesh Chand
(though this is a strong NFP constitu-
ency). Defeated and disillusioned,
Labour returned to Parliament in
August and began to repair its relation-
ship with Rabuka's known opponents.
Meanwhile, Rabuka was consoli-
dating his own base in the Fijian com-
munity, presenting himself as the
uncompromising champion of their
interests. He announced a number of
measures including increasing the
Fijian scholarship fund; establishing a
small-business agency to advise Fijians
on how to run small ventures; promis-
ing financial assistance to the provin-
cial councils and Rotuma to buy shares
in the exclusively Fijian investment
company, Fijian Holdings; providing
funds to Fijian mataqali 'land owning
units' to purchase fee simple land;
floating the idea of exempting Fijian
businesses from income tax for up to
twenty years; and transferring the
management of 73,841 hectares of state
land to the Native Lands Trust Board.
Not all of these promises were carried
out, as Rabuka's nationalist Fijian crit-
ics often pointed out, but the message
was clear. Rabuka was moving in the
right direction for Fijians, and it was
only a matter of time before the gov-
ernment's pro-Fijian policies bore fruit.
Indo-Fijian leaders complained of the
discrimination against their people in
the public sector, in statutory bodies,
and in government aid programs. But
their voice mattered little in a political
system where the Indo-Fijian commu-
nity itself was marginalized.
Many Fijians applauded the general
thrust of Rabuka's policies, but others
wanted further restructuring of power
within Fijian society. In May, a group
of western Fijians led by Ratu Osea
Gavidi, the founding leader of the now
defunct Western United Front, and
Sakiasi Butadroka, leader of the Fijian
Nationalist Party, launched the Viti
Levu Council of Chiefs to promote the
interests and aspirations of Fijians of
the main island of Fiji. One of the
council's resolutions was that the presi-
dency of the republic should be rotated
among the four confederacies
(Kubuna, Tovata, Burebasaga, and the
as yet not formally recognized, Yasay-
asa Vaka Ra) instead of only the first
three; that all state, and eventually fee
simple, land be converted to native ten-
ure; that Fijians be handed back all
ownership of fisheries and mineral
rights; that the government, rather
than landowners, pay the administra-
tive costs of running the Native Lands
Trust Board; and that Fijians be given
preferential treatment in the exploita-
tion of natural resources (such as for-
estry and fisheries). Only when these
concerns had been addressed, hinted
the council, should the question of
reviewing the constitution be consid-
ered.
Clearly, Rabuka was riding a tiger
he could not dismount at will. But all
his other problems paled into insignifi-
cance beside the revelations in the
report of the commission of inquiry
into the so-called Stephen Affair, pre-
sented by retired judge and politician
Sir Ronald Kermode. Anthony
Stephens, a local part-European busi-
nessman with previous brushes with
the law and a close association with
extremist Fijian politics, had been
charged in mid-1988 with illegally
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importing arms into the country. After
being cleared, he sued the government
for F$30 million in damages, but
agreed to settle for nearly $IO million
in cash and other benefits. The terms
of the deed of settlement were leaked to
the press and exposed in Parliament by
Opposition Leader Jai Ram Reddy,
leading to the resignation of Attorney
General Aptaia Seru. Under considera-
ble public and parliamentary pressure,
Rabuka appointed Kermode to inquire
into the sequence of events leading to
the deed of settlement, the legality of
the procedures followed, and the
involvement of ministers and civil ser-
vants in the affair.
Kermode's report, issued in July,
was a damning indictment of all the
principal players (I993). Stephens was
described as being "dishonest in seek-
ing to obtain money from the National
Bank of Fiji in an illegal manner and in
doing so, the evidence prima facie
appears to disclose that he may have
committed more than one criminal
offence." Attorney General Seru was
accused of lying and gross negligence.
Said Kermode: "Seru's explanation
indicates how unsuited he was to hold
the position of Attorney General."
Most important, Rabuka's conduct
was found to be "quite irregular and
improper" in several respects. His
action "as regards the events leading up
to the execution of the Deed were not
only improper but prima facie illegal."
Predictably, Rabuka denied the report's
charges and proclaimed his innocence,
refusing to stand aside to allow a judi-
cial review of the report's principal
findings regarding his role. Eventually,
he agreed somewhat reluctantly, but by
then the damage had been done. His
44I
integrity and reputation were attacked
in Parliament and in the media, and
dissidents within his own party pre-
pared to move a motion of no confi-
dence in him. The report gave Rabu-
ka's opponents the excuse and the
weapon they needed to "do Ra-
buka in."
Several Fijian backbenchers wanted
Rabuka out. One was Josefata Kami-
kamica, Mara protege, the interim
government's finance minister, and
Rabuka's rival for the top job, who had
declined all invitations to join the gov-
ernment. Ratu Mara's son, Finau, was
a key player behind the scenes. In the
Senate, Tailevu politician Adi Finau
Tabakaucoro, led the anti-Rabuka
campaign. Another vocal opponent
was sacked Minister for Information
Ilai Kuli who, like the others, sought to
disguise personal revenge as principled
opposition. Methodist Church General
Secretary Manasa Lasaro persuaded
Kuli to postpone his no-confidence
motion in the interest of Fijian unity,
while the Taukei Movement, or what
remained of it, staged protest marches
in support of Rabuka. The division in
the Fijian camp erupted into the open.
Rabuka's hold on power was con-
tested, and his days numbered.
Personal animosities apart, Rabu-
ka's problems were compounded by
allegations of mismanagement, or lack
of management, in statutory organiza-
tions. A strike at Fiji International
Telecommunications Limited had left
its scars, including the transfer and
eventual sacking of Communications
Minister Kuli. The appointment of
controversial businessman Jim Ah Koy,
Rabuka's close friend, to statutory
bodies, including the chairmanship of
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the Fiji Trade and Investment Board,
was questioned in the press. So, too,
were allegations regarding the tangled
affairs of the Fiji Ports Authority,
which led to the departure of Chief
Executive Isimeli Bose and Chairman
Navitlai Naisoro. Fijian Holdings Lim-
ited was rocked by accusations of
insider trading by its senior Fijian
directors. And questions were asked
about the propriety of awarding the
tender to upgrade the Nadi Interna-
tional Airport to a company (Minsons
Limited) in which Rabuka, his wife,
and Civil Aviation Minister Jonetani
Kauakamoce owned shares. Whatever
their merits, the allegations served to
tarnish the image of the government
and its leaders. As head of that govern-
ment, Rabuka became the main target.
The long-simmering tensions came
to a head in the November budget ses-
sion of Parliament. Finance Minister
Paul Manueli presented his F$707 mil-
lion (us$847 million) budget as a sensi-
ble document to combat the ills of the
economy following the devastating
effects of cyclone Kina, which had vis-
ited Fiji in late 1992 (Manueli 1993).
Proposed measures included further
deregulation of trade and the labor
market. Import licensing protection
was to be partly removed from rice,
powdered milk, canned fish, and cof-
fee, and replaced by a 50 percent tariff
for powdered milk, 40 percent for
milled rice, and 10 percent for brown
rice. The budget also anticipated an
increase in the national deficit from
F$I35 million (us$88 million), or 2.5
percent of the gross national product,
to F$I85 million (us$I2o.8 million), or
4.8 percent of the gross national prod-
uct. The budget was designed to
increase Fiji's international competi-
tiveness.
Opposition Leader Jai Ram Reddy
led the attack on the budget. He
described it as a fiscally irresponsible
document that proposed an unsustain-
able level of expenditure and fiscal def-
icit, as well as an escalation of public
debt and debt service. The budget, he
said, was long on rhetoric but short on
specific proposals to remedy the eco-
nomic ills; it had an inappropriate set
of expenditure priorities (too much on
the military and too little on health,
education, and social welfare); and it
was inflationary and socially regressive
because of higher fiscal duties on basic
consumer items. Labour leader
Chaudhary echoed Reddy's criticism,
adding that unless the "instability, fear,
insecurities, and uncertainties" caused
by the racially lopsided constitution,
the acute law and order situation, and
corruption were not remedied, Fiji
would not prosper (FT, 23 Nov 1993).
Although the opposition's criticism
was predictable, the government had
not anticipated the rebellion of six of
its own backbenchers and one cabinet
minister. Josefata Kamikamica led the
attack. Interestingly enough, and
unlike the opposition, Kamikamica did
not disagree with the underlying eco-
nomic philosophy of the budget, nor
with its general direction. Rather, the
thrust of his criticism concerned the
micromanagement of the economy, not
in itself sufficient justification for vot-
ing against the budget and bringing
down the government. But with
twenty-seven opposition members
against the budget, the anti-Rabuka
faction of the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa
ni Taukei saw the perfect opportunity
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to realize their plan to derail Rabuka.
When the budget came up for vote at
the second sitting of the House of Rep-
resentatives, they voted with the oppo-
sition.
The Fijian dissidents had refused to
abide by the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa
ni Taukei parliamentary caucus deci-
sion to support the budget. However,
they had briefed Mara, the acting pres-
ident, of their intention to vote against
it. That led to speculation about
Mara's role in the downfall of the
Rabuka government, but at this writ-
ing the details are not clear. What is
known is that the dissidents and the Fiji
Labour Party had asked Mara not to
dissolve Parliament but to sack Rabuka
and appoint another (Fijian) prime
minister. They told Mara that their
vote against the budget was not a vote
against the government as such, but
against Rabuka as its head. Knowing
of his antipathy toward Rabuka, they
expected Mara to view their proposal
sympathetically. Whatever his private
feelings, Mara accepted Rabuka's con-
stitutionally correct advice to prorogue
the Parliament and call for fresh elec-
tions. In this, Rabuka was supported
by Reddy, who argued that the defeat
of the budget was tantamount to the
defeat of the government, not just the
prime minister. Parliament was dis-
solved on 19 January 1994, and general
elections scheduled for mid-February
1994·
The year 1993 was a tumultuous one
for Sitiveni Rabuka. His hold on power
proved unsteady, and his political map
was disfigured by many false starts and
scarred memories. His own inconsis-
tencies, failure to deliver on promises,
and inexperience contributed to his dif-
ficulties. He admitted to thinking with
his heart rather than with his head.
These problems were compounded by
disloyalty from within his own ranks,
and from others who refused to recog-
nize him as a legitimate successor to
Ratu Mara's political throne. Fijian
politics faces a rocky future. Provin-
cialism is on the rise, and parliamentar-
ians proclaim their loyalty to province
rather than political party. The year's
events showed again that the certain-
ties of the past had disappeared. A
new, uncertain era was on the horizon.
BRIJ V. LAL
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NEW CALEDONIA
At the beginning of 1993, it was becom-
ing increasingly apparent that the
March elections would give the Right a
comfortable majority in the National
Assembly in Paris. In New Caledonia,
the position the new majority would
take on the Matignon Accords was the
subject of much speculation. Signed in
1988 by the Front de liberation natio-
nale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS, repre-
senting various pro-independence fac-
tions), the Rassemblement pour la
Caledonie dans la Republique (RPCR,
the major loyalist group), and the
French national government, the
accords had been soundly denounced
by a large portion of the Right.
As it turned out, however, new
Minister for Overseas Territories
Dominique Perben was quick to con-
firm that the process begun with the
accords would continue. He said New
Caledonia was the only overseas terri-
tory of France where things seemed to
be going well and, in spite of the diffi-
cult economic situation in France,
there was no reason to reduce metro-
politan support for the ongoing effort.
During his June visit to the territory,
the minister reaffirmed his govern-
ment's commitment to continuing in
the direction set by the accords.
In the March legislative elections,
nine candidates were listed for the first
electoral district (Noumea, the three
municipalities of the Loyalty Islands,
and the Isle of Pines), and six for the
second (the other twenty-seven munici-
palities of the main island). While the
sheer number of candidates had led
most observers to expect that a second
round of voting would be needed, the
two incumbents, both members of the
RPCR, were reelected after the first
round. Jacques Lafleur obtained 53.27
percent of the vote in the first electoral
district, and Maurice Nenou 54.15 per-
cent in the second. Voter turnout was
relatively low, with only 57.8 percent of
the registered voters casting ballots.
Within the FLNKS there was much
debate about whether the long-stand-
ing policy of boycotting national elec-
tions should be continued or aban-
doned. For several months Union
caledonienne, the largest party within
the FLNKS, had been advocating a
resumption of participation in national
elections, and it managed to win the
support of two of the smaller parties,
Union progressiste metanesienne and
Parti socialiste kanak. Meanwhile,
Parti de liberation kanak (PALIKA)
maintained its earlier position and con-
tinued to encourage its members to
abstain from voting. However, it did
consent to the use of the FLNKS label by
the two pro-independence candidates
who entered the race.
FLNKs Vice-President Rock Wamy-
tan obtained 14.32 percent of the vote
in the first electoral district, and Presi-
dent of North Province Leopold
Joredie won 29.81 percent in the sec-
ond district. The FLNKS had counted on
a better showing, and PALIKA leaders
argued that the poor results reflected
voters' opinions regarding the running
of the North and Loyalty Islands prov-
inces by pro-independence factions.
Mouvement des caledoniens libres,
a splinter group of the RPCR founded in
early January 1993 by former Senator
Dick Ukeiwe, and a political party in
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its own right since its members were
expelled from the RPCR, presented two
candidates: Dick Ukeiwe and Justin
Guillemard. In earlier provincial elec-
tions, Guillemard had represented a
small anti-independence party called
Caledonie demain (Caledonia Tomor-
row), which fielded two candidates of
its own in the 1993 national elections.
For the territory as a whole, Mouve-
ment des Caledoniens Libres obtained
12.46 percent of the votes. In the first
electoral district, its candidate won 16
percent of the votes, placing second,
ahead of the pro-independence candi-
date.
The elections also offered an oppor-
tunity to reassess Union Oceanienne,
which largely represents migrants from
Wallis and Futuna, following its split
into two factions in 1992. The factions
presented one candidate each in both
electoral districts, although all ran
under the Union Oceanienne banner.
Overall, Union Oceanienne appears to
have maintained its position, gathering
4.2 percent of the vote compared with
the 3.9 percent achieved in the 1989
provincial elections held shortly after
the party was founded. The dissident
faction, led by Aloisio Sako and lean-
ing toward a pro-independence posi-
tion, collected 1255 votes. The more
centrist faction led by Michel Hema,
president of the party before the
schism, won only 943.
The dispute between Mayor of
Lifou Cono Hamu and the traditional
chiefly authorities, which has been
ongoing for several years, appears to
have been resolved during 1993. The
incumbent mayor failed to get the sup-
port of hi~ party, Union Caledonienne,
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when elections were called following
the resignation of several municipal
councillors. Cono Hamu ran anyway,
and his faction took the lead after the
first round of voting, with 23 percent of
the vote. However, they were defeated
during the second round by an unlikely
alliance between members of the RPCR
and several small pro-independence
factions running under the banner of
"custom" and support for the tradi-
tional chiefly structure. The alliance
picked up 39 percent of the vote, and
20 of the 29 seats contested.
Nevertheless, Hamu's supporters
continued their campaign. Some of
them targeted the provincial authori-
ties, particularly the president of the
Islands Province, whose Noumea home
was attacked. In April, following his
decision to extend the movement he
had started in Lifou to the other islands
of the Loyalty Group, Cono Hamu was
expelled from the membership of
Union Caledonienne.
On 25 December 1993, Catholics
observed the one-hundred-fiftieth anni-
versary of the celebration of the first
mass in New Caledonia. During the
ceremonies, and on behalf of the entire
church, Archbishop of Noumea Mon-
signor Calvet formally asked the for-
giveness of Melanesians for "the suffer-
ings and acts of injustice inflicted on
their ancestors, who were forced to
relinquish a part of their culture." This
request for forgiveness was received
and accepted by representatives of the
eight "cultural areas" of the territory.
Generally, social tensions were more
pronounced than in preceding years,
particularly near the end of the year.
The number of person-days lost to
--
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labor strikes rose to 25,010 in 1993,
compared to 19,368 in 1992. This num-
ber reflected not only the usual work-
place friction, but growing sentiments
that political peace has received more
attention than social progress in recent
years, and that the economic benefits
generated in part by the Matignon
Accords have not been fairly distrib-
uted.
On the regional level, New Caledo-
nia continued to cultivate and improve
its relationships with other Pacific
countries, particularly Vanuatu. In
April, Vanuatu's prime minister came
to Noumea to open a new consulate. In
November, New Caledonia and Vanu-
atu signed a cooperation agreement
complementing the one signed in July
between Vanuatu and the French
Republic. Vanuatu's new attitude
toward the New Caledonian indepen-
dence movement was also apparent.
While the former government in Port
Vila was vocal in its support of the
struggle for independence, current
Prime Minister Maxime Carlot Kor-
man has declined to get involved in
New Caledonia's internal affairs. At
the end of his official visit to the terri-
tory, Carlot Korman stated that his
position was purely one of support for
the Matignon Accords.
FRAN90IS SODTER
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
At the beginning of 1993, the govern-
ment of Paias Wingti appeared well
placed to implement some of the ambi-
tious reforms announced after it came
to power in mid-1992. The coalition
commanded a comfortable majority in
Parliament, and had successfully intro-
duced several significant reform mea-
sures during its first six months in
office. More important, its eighteen-
month grace period of immunity from
parliamentary votes of no confidence
still had twelve months to run. In Sep-
tember 1993 Wingti engineered a stun-
ning parliamentary coup that extended
this immunity to early 1995. Neverthe-
less, and with some notable excep-
tions, the government had difficulty
implementing its policies in 1993. By
year's end, with several major initia-
tives in disarray, it appeared unlikely
that Wingti could deliver the sort of
comprehensive and fundamental
reform he had promised.
The Wingti government did have
some remarkable successes during the
year, particularly in its dealings with
the transnational companies operating
in Papua New Guinea's rich mineral
and petroleum sectors. The extremely
high rates of economic growth in
recent years (II.8 percent in 1992 and
an expected 14.4 percent in 1993) are
mainly attributable to developments in
these sectors, and Wingti came to
power determined to capture a larger
share of the benefits for Papua New
Guineans. In January 1993 the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund was commis-
sioned to review the fiscal regime for
mining, petroleum, and gas. By that
time, however, Wingti's high-stakes
struggle with the mining companies
was well under way.
At the beginning of the year, negoti-
ations with the partners in the Porgera
Joint Venture over an increased equity
share for the state were deadlocked. In
1992, the government had demanded to
increase its share in the giant gold mine
tN, ,171' " , ,
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from 10 percent to 30 percent, claiming
that the mine's operator, Placer Pacific,
had deliberately downplayed the pro-
ject's financial potential when the min-
ing agreement was signed. Although
the government claimed the negotia-
tions were purely commercial in
nature, the international financial com-
munity reacted with suspicion. One
analyst described the impact of
Wingti's aggressive actions at Porgera
and elsewhere in the mining sector as
"nothing short of devastating." He esti-
mated that the market value of Papua
New Guinea-related mining and oil
stocks had declined by 22 percent since
the Wingti government came to power
(Davis 1993, 24)·
Fearing that a false step could put
their billion-dollar investment at risk,
the joint venture partners were obliged
to negotiate the sale of equity. As Man-
aging Director Vic Botts of Placer
Pacific put it, "We did not think it was
good business to confront the Govern-
ment" (pc, 18 Aug 1993,2). By early
1993, their main concern was the extent
of the concessions necessary to restore
a more favorable political environ-
ment.
The deal finalized in March repre-
sented a major victory for the govern-
ment. It allowed the state to purchase
an additional 15 percent equity in the
joint venture (5 percent from each of
the three corporate partners) for
138,750,000 kina, significantly lower
than the estimated market value of the
shares. More important, payment
would come from the state's new share
of the cash flow, making the invest-
ment virtually risk free. No interest
was payable until the principal had
been fully paid off. If the mine were to
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cease production before that time, the
transaction would be interest free. Rev-
enues from taxation were unaffected
by the arrangement, and the state
would get a share of dividend income.
Furthermore, the partners agreed to
finance and implement a 50-million-
kina infrastructure development pro-
gram in Enga, Southern Highlands,
and Western Highlands provinces over
the next decade, in return for tax cred-
its (Iangalio 1993).
As Mark Davis pointed out, the
costs of the deal to the three private
partners, Placer Pacific, Renison Gold-
fields Consolidated, and Highlands
Gold were significant, but "not as high
as they might have been." The agree-
ment protects the companies' cash
flows until the state's debt is paid off,
and offers intrinsic tax concessions
worth an estimated 40 million kina.
Most important, the joint venturers
believed that they had "made a crucial
gain in predictability and stability"
(Davis 1993, 24-25).
The ownership structure of the pro-
posed Lihir gold mine in New Ireland
province was also a major source of
contention during the year. The gov-
ernment was concerned that the devel-
opment of this major resource was
being delayed unnecessarily by Kenne-
cott, a subsidiary of the London-based
mining giant Rio Tinto Zinc. Kenne-
cott argued that the project was eco-
nomically marginal, and indicated its
reluctance to proceed unless a third
party could be persuaded to join the
Kennecott-Niugini Mining joint ven-
ture. The company suggested that the
prevailing investment climate made it
difficult to find such a partner, and that
the Wingti government must accept
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some responsibility for that situation
(Togarewa 1993a; 1993b; 1993C).
The government used two tactics to
push Kennecott toward an agreement
to develop the Lihir project. The first
involved calling Kennecott's bluff on
the equity issue. After Kennecott had
failed to meet a deadline to find a third
party, the government announced that
it would take up 20 percent of the
equity itself, in addition to the 30 per-
cent it had opted for previously. In a
June letter to the chairman of Rio
Tinto Zinc, Sir Derek Birkin, Prime
Minister Wingti stated, "This lessens
Kennecott's exposure to a project in
which it dearly lacks confidence, and
will, I trust, facilitate immediate
progress on the project" (Togarewa
1993b). In August, Mining Minister
langalio angrily rejected a belated pro-
posal by Kennecott to sell a 20 percent
share to a Canadian mining company,
Venezuelan Goldfields. He confirmed
that the government still planned to
take 50 percent, and would find its own
buyer for the extra 20 percent (PC, 13
Aug 1993, I). The Malaysian govern-
ment had already expressed interest in
investing in Lihir through its company
Malaysian Mining Corporation
(Togarewa 1993a).
The second tactic used by the gov-
ernment to speed up the development
of the Lihir resource was active
involvement in the planning and design
of the project. With Bob Needham,
head of the state-owned Mineral
Resources Development Corporation,
in the lead, government officials and
consultants subjected Kennecott's
development plan to intense scrutiny.
By September, estimated capital costs
had been cut by 20 percent, improving
the economics of the project considera-
bly (pc, 29 Oct 1993, 9; Needham
1993,53)·
By late September, with the govern-
ment and its corporate partners in gen-
eral agreement regarding project
financing, it seemed likely that a spe-
cial mining license would be issued in
December, and that construction
would begin early in 1994. The part-
ners had agreed that the state and
Niugini Mining would each take 30
percent of the project, with Kennecott
holding 40 percent. They also agreed
to float up to 40 percent of the shares
in Lihir Gold, the project vehicle.
Venezuelan Gold and Malaysian Min-
ing Corporation were expected to pur-
chase a significant proportion of those
shares (pc, 27 Sept 1993, I). Then, at
the mining forum in November, where
final details of the agreement were to
be negotiated, local representatives
demanded 20 percent of the equity for
the landowners, and a further 10 per-
cent for the provincial government
(TPNG, 4 Nov 1993, 4). After their
walkout, which brought talks to a halt,
the government agreed to help the
landowner company, Pangpang Devel-
opment Corporation, borrow money
to purchase shares in Lihir Gold (pc, 8
Nov 1993, I). The special mining lease
had not been issued by year's end, but
was expected early in 1994.
Meanwhile, the International Mon-
etary Fund's report, presented in April,
noted that the state's ability to capture
revenues from the exploitation of its
mineral resources had been disappoint-
ing. It recommended a new fiscal
regime that relied more heavily on roy-
alties, and a lowering of the existing
threshold for additional profits tax, a
device used to capture a large portion
of exceptionally high profits for the
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state. It also recommended an immedi-
ate strengthening of the state's capacity
to monitor the fiscal aspects of
resource projects and to enforce its tax
regulations. Significantly, the report
argued strongly that purchasing large
amounts of equity in resource projects
was risky, a poor use of scarce govern-
ment resources, weakened the state's
ability to borrow overseas, and con-
flicted with its regulatory duties (TPNG,
IS April 1993, I). The events of 1993
demonstrate that at least some key
members of the Wingti government
and their advisers were not impressed
by this advice, and in September the
government agreed to increase its stake
in the Ok Tedi copper and gold mine
from 20 percent to 30 percent after
Amoco Minerals withdrew (pc, 30 Sept
1993, I). For them, it seems, equity par-
ticipation is a useful instrument to
exercise more control over large-scale
resource developments in Papua New
Guinea (Needham 1993).
Wingti's determination to "look
north" to the dynamic countries of Asia
for trade and investment opportunities
also bore some fruit in 1993. His three-
day visit to Indonesia in February,
accompanied by some two hundred
officials, politicians, and business exec-
utives, yielded a proposal for coopera-
tion on oil and gas exploration, and
one to establish a coffee processing fac-
tory in Papua New Guinea (TPNG, II
Feb 1993, I; 18 Feb 1993, 4, 21). The
visit symbolized the beginning of a
new, more broad-based, era in Papua
New Guinea-Indonesia relations, long.
dominated by a narrow concern with
the spillover effects of the guerrilla
struggle in Irian Jaya.
Equally significant was the govern-
ment's newfound enthusiasm for
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Malaysia. Wingti visited Kuala Lum-
pur in January, and Malaysia's Interna-
tional Trade Minister Dato Seri Rafi-
dah Aziz led a large trade and
investment delegation to Papua New
Guinea in May. Malaysian companies
are best known in Papua New Guinea
for their heavy and controversial
involvement in the logging industry,
described in a recent report as "out of
control" (Nadarajah 1993). In welcom-
ing the Malaysian delegation in May,
Minister for Trade and Industry David
Mai warned that foreign logging com-
panies "either comply with the local
rules or they are out" (1993, 58). Never-
theless, the government has welcomed
new Malaysian investment in the coun-
try, offering Kimpulani Fima an attrac-
tive package of incentives to establish
in Lae a mackerel-canning plant (which
relies heavily on imported materials, at
least initially), and inviting Malaysian
Mining to purchase a share of the Lihir
gold mine (TPNG, I4Jan 1993, 26).
In June, despite strong opposition
from a wide range of senior officials,
cabinet approved a 50-million-kina
plan to provide housing for the disci-
plined forces to be funded by the
Malaysian government and a consor-
tium of Malaysian banks (TPNG, 10
June 1993, I). Officials noted that the
deal had been arranged without regard
to normal tendering, planning, and
budgetary procedures, and was not a
good one for Papua New Guinea. They
argued that the costs were excessive,
local content low, and that the Malay-
sian contractor, which the funding
institutions had been allowed to select,
would pay no taxes, fees, or import
duties (TPNG, 24 June 1993, I; pc, 25
June 1993, I). Equally controversial
was the government's decision to allow
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Rimbunan Hijau, a company that con-
trols more than 70 percent of Papua
New Guinea's logging leases, to estab-
lish a new daily newspaper (pc, 12 July
1993, I). Critics feared that the Nation,
which started publishing in November,
would become a vehicle to promote the
company's commercial interests. The
associate editor is Mr Wingti's former
press secretary, and the publisher one
of his close political associates. Early in
the year, Rimbunan Hijau adopted the
slogan We care for Papua New Guinea
to help counter its negative corporate
image (TPNG, 15 July 1993, 27).
The Wingti government's increasing
enthusiasm for Asia has been matched
by a growing ambivalence toward Aus-
tralia. Part of the motivation for the
"look north" policy is clearly to lessen
the country's heavy dependence on the
former colonial power, especially for
trade and investment, but also for tech-
nical assistance and advice. Papua New
Guinea leaders are very sensitive about
questions of sovereignty, and periodi-
cally complain that Australians are
paternalistic in their dealings with
Papua New Guineans. In 1993 Minister
for Foreign Affairs John Kaputin was
the most prominent proponent of this
View.
Kaputin dem"anded early in the year
that Australia apologize for its disre-
spectful and arrogant behavior while
attempting to return two African refu-
gees who had entered Australia ille-
gally from Papua New Guinea (pc, 19
Feb 1993, I; I March, I). Later, when
two prominent naturalized citizens
reclaimed their Australian citizenship,
Kaputin stated that he would not toler-
ate "foreigners who think they can
treat Papua New Guinea without
respect and dignity" (1993b, 64). In an
outspoken address in Canberra in
November, he argued that "attitudes,
both official and private," were a major
impediment to improved relations
between Australia and Papua New
Guinea (Kaputin 1993c, 16). Aspects of
Kaputin's speech were reiterated by
Deputy Prime Minister Chan in Bris-
bane in November (Chan 1993). Yet
Papua New Guinea leaders also recog-
nize that the relationship with Austra-
lia is, and will remain, a key one. In his
Canberra speech, for example, the for-
eign minister seemed to want Australia
to pay more attention to Papua New
Guinea, not less.
A major point of tension in the rela-
tionship in 1993 was the ongoing shift
from untied to tied forms of Australian
aid. Until recently, Australia has pro-
vided the bulk of its substantial aid to
Papua New Guinea, set at 219 million
kina for 1993-94, in the form of direct
budgetary support, which leaders were
free to spend as they saw fit. Then in
1989 Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and
Rabbie Namaliu signed the Develop-
ment Cooperation Treaty, providing
for a progressive reduction in the level
of Australian aid, as well as a rapid
shift from budget support to program
and project funding. By 1993, tied aid
represented 16 percent of the total. The
plan is to increase this to 52 percent by
1997, and phase out budget support
completely by the year 2000 (Aopi
1993,3). Early in 1993, a major joint
study was initiated to investigate how
the increasing amounts of program and
project aid might best be spent (pc, 9
Feb 1993, 2).
The shift to tied aid was motivated
primarily by a feeling in Australia that
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the 3.7 billion kina of support provided
to Papua New Guinea between 1975
and 1993 had not been well spent. In a
speech on the aid relationship in
December, Australia's Minister for
Pacific Island Affairs Gordon Bilney
argued that Australian aid should be
used to meet Papua New Guinea's "real
needs," implying that it had not been
used in that way to date (1993, II).
Officials in Papua New Guinea argue
that the shift to tied aid is also moti-
vated by commercial considerations,
and estimate that up to 85 percent of
project aid will flow back into the Aus-
tralian economy (Aopi 1993, 7).
Understandably, leaders in Papua
New Guinea are less than enthusiastic
about the change, not least because it
means an increase in Australia's direct
involvement in Papua New Guinea's
domestic affairs. Officials are also con-
cerned that the real value of Australian
aid to Papua New Guinea will decline,
because of excessive administrative and
consultancy costs as well as increased
purchasing in Australia. Nevertheless,
leaders had little option but to adjust to
the new reality. After making his reser-
vations clear in a major speech in
November, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Finance and Planning Sir
Julius Chan went on to say, "I am a
realist and pragmatic enough to accept
that a new system is desired by the
donor and so long as PNG needs that
money, we must now all do our best to
make it work" (1993, 8). "Making it
work" will not be easy for either side,
and Australian officials may well live
to regret their decision to get more
directly involved in some of Papua
New Guinea's more intractable prob-
lenis.
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Shortly after coming to power,
Prime Minister Wingti stated that the
provincial government system was
wasteful and inefficient and had to go.
In reports tabled in March and August
1993, a parliamentary select committee
chaired by Ben Micah recommended
replacing the existing nineteen provin-
cial governments with provincial
authorities (TPNG, II March 1993, II;
19 Aug 1993, 4). Unlike provincial gov-
ernments, these would have few legis-
lative powers, no autonomous bureau-
cracies, and no full-time, salaried
provincial politicians. The membership
would consist of all the national mem-
bers of Parliament from the province,
local government council presidents,
mayors, and representatives of non-
governmental organizations. Each
authority would be headed by the
regional (province-wide) representative
to the national Parliament. This part of
the "bipartisan model" would recentra-
lize political power, and give national
members of Parliament considerably
more control over the distribution of
resources in their electorates (Saffu
1993,7)·
The Micah committee also recom-
mended "the single most important
change since independence"-the res-
urrection of hundreds of local-level
governments. These village-level insti-
tutions would be constitutionally guar-
anteed sufficient financial and adminis-
trative support to operate effectively
(TPNG, 19 Aug 1993, 4). However,
local-level government has been under
the jurisdiction of provincial govern-
ments since 1976 and has been almost
universally neglected. It is not clear
that national parliamentarians would
be any more prepared than their pro-
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vincial counterparts to fund potential
political rivals, or to ensure that this
was a genuine decentralization of
power.
Predictably, the Micah reports were
well received by all but a few members
of Parliament. In August, Parliament
quickly endorsed a proposal to estab-
lish an eighteen-member Constitu-
tional Commission, headed by Micah,
to implement the reports' recommen-
dations. Armed with extremely broad
terms of reference, the commission set
about reviewing the Organic Law on
Provincial Government, and other rele-
vant parts of the constitution (Saffu
1993,6). However, the assault on the
provincial government system ran into
some major obstacles later in the year.
The provincial premiers organized
quickly to resist the Micah initiative.
In September, a special meeting of the
National Premiers Council totally
rejected the committee's findings. The
premiers of the New Guinea Islands
region announced that they would
secede if the recommendations of the
report were implemented, and began
organizing a referendum on the issue.
Manus Premier Stephen Pokawin said
he would arrange a public burning of
the report when he got home (TPNG, 9
Sept 1993, I). The provincial resistance
was not unexpected. What was a sur-
prise was Prime Minister Wingti's
response to the premiers' demands
when he met them in Goroka in Octo-
ber. Instead of launching the expected
attack on provincial government, he
took a very conciliatory line, even
inviting the premiers to join some
members of his government on a new
review committee (TPNG, 7 Oct 1993,
I). In turn, Micah demanded that
Wingti publicly reconfirm his support
for the constitutional commission
(TPNG, 14 Oct 1993, 3). Although
Wingti managed to persuade Micah
not to resign early in November, the
future of the whole review exercise
remained uncertain at the end of the
year (TPNG, 4 Nov 1993, 9).
Wingti's sudden change of heart on
the provincial government issue was
undoubtedly related to the barrage of
criticism created by his resignation and
immediate reelection as prime minister
in September. However, even without
that political firestorm (discussed
later), the threat of secession had to be
taken seriously. Furthermore, it was
unclear how the architects of the pro-
posal to abolish provincial government
planned to deal with the Bougainville
issue. In April, with large parts of the
island back under government control,
leaders from all parts of Bougainville
met to discuss ways of resolving the
five-year-old crisis. The idea of seces-
sion was described as "an impediment
to peace," and "rejected outright now
and in the future." However, the lead-
ers demanded that the North Solomons
Provincial Government be reinstated
immediately, and argued that failure to
do so could "regerminate and legiti-
mize" secessionist sentiments in the
province (pc, 27 April 1993, II).
Although Prime Minister Wingti
came to power committed to an early
end to the Bougainville crisis, his first
major policy statement on the issue did
not come until March 1993. He chose
to take a hard line with the rebels,
describing them as "murderers" who
must surrender or face death. Those
who have committed atrocities, he
said, must pay for their crimes because
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"History teaches us that a bully must
be beaten at his own game" (TPNG, 18
March 1993, 2). What was missing was
any sense of how the social and politi-
cal fabric of the war-torn province
would be restored, if and when a mili-
tary victory was achieved.
Wingti's March statement appeared
to confirm the conventional wisdom
that the military, rather than the gov-
ernment, had the upper hand in the
Bougainville operation. In recent years
numerous aid workers and journalists
have been refused entry to Bougainville
despite clear authorization from Port
Moresby. In November, a prominent
international medical aid group with-
drew from the country altogether, cit-
ing such frustrations. A spokesperson
for Medecin Sans Frontihes expressed
the opinion that Bougainville was
being run by a "dictatorship of the
defence force" (pc, 22 Nov 1993, I).
Minister for Bougainville Michael
Ogio had done little to dispel this
notion earlier in the year. Responding
to reports that the security forces had
crossed the border with the Solomon
Islands and taken control of Oema
Island, Ogio acknowledged that the
government had difficulty monitoring
and controlling the actions of the
security forces (TPNG, IS April 1993, 3).
This was one of several confrontations,
some involving exchanges of fire,
between Papua New Guinea and Solo-
mon Islands security forces during the
year (TPNG, 7 Jan 1993, 2; PC, 27 April
1993, I).
The security forces continued to
expand their presence on Bougainville
during 1993, establishing more bases in
central and southern parts of the
island, and arming civilian "resistance
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groups" to counter the activities of the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army. In
February, with some fanfare, troops
moved into the devastated provincial
capital of Arawa (pc, 16 Feb 1993, I).
But this part of Operation Dynamo did
not go as smoothly as planned. Ten
days later, rebels ambushed and killed
eight soldiers outside the town, the
greatest number of casualties suffered
by the security forces in a single inci-
dent since the crisis began (pc, 26 Feb
1993, I). In a series of offensives over
the next two weeks, soldiers killed an
estimated thirty-five rebels in various
parts of central and southern Bougain-
ville (pc, 10 March 1993, 5).
Criticism of the Wingti govern-
ment's handling of the Bougainville cri-
sis came from many different directions
during 1993. The London-based
human rights organization Amnesty
International issued its second major
report on the crisis in November,
claiming that at least sixty people had
been extrajudicially killed by govern-
ment forces since 1991, and citing
numerous cases of torture, rape, beat-
ings, and harassment of suspected
Bougainville Revolutionary Army
members or sympathizers. Similar
abuses were attributed by Amnesty
to the rebel forces. Despite numerous
statements of intent by government
officials, the report noted that very lit-
tle had actually been done to investi-
gate allegations of human rights abuses
and take steps to ensure that they did
not recur (Amnesty International
1993)·
Solomon Islands Prime Minister
Solomon Mamaloni was equally out-
spoken in his condemnation of the
Wingti government's Bougainville pol-
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icy. In an extraordinary departure from
normal diplomatic protocols, Mama-
loni wrote a fourteen-page letter to
Papua New Guinea Deputy Prime Min-
ister Sir Julius Chan, in which he
accused the government of indifference
to "the total annihilation of Bougain-
villeans," among other things (pc, 24
March 1993, II; 25 March, II; 26
March, II). Another letter leaked to
the press during the year, this one seven
pages long, indicated some dissent
within the government itself. Minister
for Foreign Affairs John Kaputin wrote
to the prime minister to express his dis-
may at the aggressive tone of Wingti's
Bougainville statement and the cabi-
net's decision to delay inviting an inter-
national fact-finding mission to visit
(pc, 15 April 1993, I). In a subsequent
statement to Parliament, Kaputin
warned that failure to allow such visits
"could have far reaching-and adverse
-implications for Papua New Guinea"
(I993a ,3)·
Perhaps the most hopeful develop-
ment during the year was the pan-
Bougainville dialogue inaugurated by
the leaders at Buka in April (pc, 27
April 1993, II). There were strong indi-
cations that powerful factions within
the rebel movement were ready to par-
ticipate in further talks. However, the
Wingti government was apparently not
prepared to facilitate a second confer-
ence in Cairns that would have
included representatives of the seces-
sionist movement.
The Wingti government had prom-
ised firm action on Papua New Guin-
ea's perennial problems of law and
order, and several strategies were pur-
sued. Late in 1992, plans were
announced to increase the strength of
the police force by fifteen hundred over
three years (TPNG, 23 Dec 1992, 2). By
August 1993, boom gates were under
construction on three roads into Port
Morseby, presumably to help police
control the movement of criminals
(TPNG, 26 Aug 1993, 9). Meanwhile,
the National Law, Order and Justice
Council had been formed to replace a
plethora of existing law and order
committees (pc, 15 March 1993, I).
Much more significant was a series of
legislative measures introduced or
announced during 1993 that were
designed to combat civil disorder.
In July, arguing that "The crime
problem facing us warrants drastic
action," Wingti announced a system of
national registration and associated
identification cards. He also
announced the introduction of a con-
stitutional amendment that would
allow the burden of proof to be shifted
from the state to the accused in serious
criminal cases (pc, 27 July 1993, I). Pre-
dictably, this measure raised the ire of
civil libertarians, with former Attorney
General Bernard Narokobi describing
presumption of innocence as "the cor-
nerstone of civilized democratic
societies" (pc, 30 July 1993, I).
The most controversial law and
order measure introduced in 1993 was
the Internal Security Act passed by Par-
liament in May and gazetted in August.
The Act allows the head of state to ban
organizations that are, in his opinion,
"promoting or encouraging, or . . .
likely to or about to promote or
encourage terrorism." Appeals against
designation as a terrorist organization
are to be heard, not by an independent
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body, but by cabinet and the head of
state, who would have issued the
orders in the first place. Alleged mem-
bers or supporters of such organiza-
tions can be identified by the police
commissioner and imprisoned (TPNG,
20 May 1993, 4, II, IS).
Critics were dismayed by the way
the legislation was pushed through Par-
liament without serious debate. They
were also concerned about the enor-
mous discretionary power it gives to
the executive branch of the govern-
ment, and the associated erosion of the
individual freedoms protected by the
constitution. In October, the Ombuds-
man Commission filed a challenge to
the Act in the Supreme Court (TPNG, 7
Oct 1993, I).
The court had not passed judgment
on the Internal Security Act by the end
of the year. By this time Wingti himself
was having second thoughts about its
utility. In another stunning reversal,
the prime minister announced in Octo-
ber that he would consider amend-
ments to the Act. The immediate impe-
tus for this particular change of heart
seems to have come from Minister for
Mining Masket Iangalio, who had
already gained the support of some
other members of the government (pc,
6 Oct 1993, I). Like his previous rever-
salon the provincial government issue,
Wingti's decision was heavily influ-
enced by the political fallout from his
slick maneuvers in Parliament at the
end of September.
The mechanics ofWingti's Septem-
ber ploy were simple. He gave a letter
of resignation dated Thursday, 23 Sep-
tember to Governor General Sir Wiwa
Korowi. On the morning of 24 Septem-
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ber, Speaker Bill Skate announced the
resignation in Parliament, read the
governor general's response, and called
for nominations for the office of prime
minister. With the opposition caught
completely off guard, Communications
Minister Martin Thompson, the archi-
tect of the scheme, nominated Wingti,
who was duly reelected unopposed
(TPNG, 30 Sept 1993, 4). Wingti
claimed that the possibility of a vote of
no confidence early in 1994 was an
unacceptable source of instability that
placed his reform program in jeopardy.
As it turned out, his successful bid to
remove the threat served to weaken,
rather than strengthen, his position.
Speculation about likely contenders
for power in a vote of no confidence
had long centered on Deputy Prime
Minister and Leader of the Peoples
Progress Party Sir Julius Chan, who
was known to disagree with Wingti
over certain key policy issues, such as
how best to deal with the mining com-
panies. Furthermore, his party's parlia-
mentary strength, at twenty, was sec-
ond only to that of Wingti's Peoples
Democratic Party, and could have pro-
vided the core of a new coalition. It
was no coincidence that Wingti's resig-
nation gambit occurred when Chan
was out of the country. Chan claimed
no prior knowledge of it (TPNG, 30
Sept 1993, 3)·
Wingti underestimated the level of
opposition that his move would pro-
voke. Several thousand people
marched on Parliament to demand the
resignation ofWingti, Skate, and
Korowi. Chris Havieta, who had
become leader of the opposition after
Jack Genia died suddenly of malaria in
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
New Year's Eve 1992 brought havoc to
the southeastern parts of Solomon
Islands as Cyclone Nina passed
through. Parts of Malaita, South
Guadalcanal, Makira, Temotu, and
Rennell and Bellona were devastated.
For the people in these islands, a sea-
son of celebration and reflection
became overnight a time of disaster
and lost hopes. Homes and schools had
to be rebuilt, new gardens had to be
cleared, and short-term assistance was
necessary. The much-needed assistance
was given promptly when the whole
nation pitched in and, with some help
from other governments and organiza-
tions, pledged SI$L5 million toward the
government's rehabilitation program
(ss, March 1993). As in the aftermath
of other natural disasters, Solomon
Islanders looked to the future with
optimism as they rebuilt their homes,
churches, and schools, and hoped for
better fortune in the year to come.
Another kind of storm-a political
one-was awaited with equal uncer-
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tainty. The national general election
took place on 26 May 1993. Seats in
each of the 47 constituencies through-
out the country were contested by
some 280 candidates. The state of
uncertainty lasted for some time after
the results were announced over na-
tional radio. Solomon Mamaloni's
party of National Unity won the most
seats, but with only 21 of the total of 47
it did not have a clear majority. Of the
other parties, the People's Alliance
Party led by Nathaniel Waena won 7
seats; the new National Action Party of
Solomon Islands (Francis Saemala) and
the United Party (Ezekiel Alebua) won
5 each; the Labour Party (loses Tuha-
nuku) won 4; the National Front for
Progress (Andrew Nori) and the new
Solomon Islands Leaders Fellowship
(Reverend Michael Maeliau) won 2
each; and 1 was won by an indepen-
dent (Francis Billy Hilly). A coalition
government had to be formed.
Uncertainty and political specula-
tion were fueled by strong indications
that veteran politician and incumbent
Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni
and his party might lose their parlia-
mentary majority. The first sign of
impending doom for Mamaloni came
with the election for Speaker of the
House, which was held a few weeks
after the general election and before
that for the new prime minister. In the
election for the Speaker, the two con-
tending groups, the Government for
National Unity led by Mamaloni and
the National Coalition Partnership
group whose leader was yet to be
named, fielded their respective candi-
dates. Waita Ben, who was then
Speaker, was the nominee of the Gov-
ernment for National Unity, and Paul
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Tovua, who had just lost his Malango
(central Guadalcanal) constituency
seat, was nominated by the National
Coalition. When Paul Tovua was
elected Speaker, political gurus were
left with little doubt that, if the coali-
tion (especially its new members) held
together and survived the intense lob-
bying, political intrigue, and wantok
manipulations that characterized the
period leading to the election for prime
minister, it would have a chance to lead
the next government. When the votes
for prime minister were counted, Ma-
maloni's party for National Unity was
ousted by the narrowest margin since
independence-24 votes to 23. On 18
June, a new government was formed,
led by the 45-year-old member for
Ranongga and Simbo, the Honourable
Francis Billy Hilly.
The new coalition government con-
sists of the existing parties-Peoples'
Alliance Party, United Party, Labour
Party, National Front for Progress-
and the independent member, plus two
new parties-the National Action
PaIty of the Solomon Islands and the
Solomon Islands Leaders Fellowship.
(Though a political anomaly, the last
insisted it not be called a political
party.)
Though Hilly was new as prime
minister, a post dominated by Solomon
Mamaloni or Sir Peter Kenilorea since
1974, he was not a novice in politics.
After a Bachelor's degree from the Uni-
versity of the South Pacific and almost
two years of employment with the gov-
ernment and the Solomon Trading
Company, Hilly entered politics in
June 1976 as member of Parliament for
Ranongga and Simbo. He was returned
for a second term in the 1980 elections
and became the leader of the indepen-
dent group in Parliament. In this sec-
ond term, he became deputy prime
minister and served as minister for the
Ministry of Home Affairs in a coalition
government led by Peter Kenilorea. In
August 1981, Hilly resigned from the
coalition, serving as an ordinary mem-
ber, and did not seek reelection in the
1984 elections. Instead, he successfully
ran in the Western Province elections
and became president of the Western
Provincial Assembly. In 1989, he ran
unsuccessfully for the National Parlia-
ment. At the time of the elections in
May 1993, he was running a family
business.
One of the chief aims of the parties
that made up the coalition was to oust
Mamaloni's strong Government of
National Unity, and they closed ranks
to do it. Among other matters, such as
allegations of corruption, the Mama-
loni government appeared to have
allowed prime land sites in and around
the capital to be bought and occupied
by foreign investors. Eager to change
the situation, and guided by their new
vision and new policies, the coalition
was determined to lead the country and
carry the developmental trajectory in a
different direction.
The new government led by Francis
Billy Hilly did not acquire political
power without having its mettle tested
and its unity shaken. From the begin-
ning, the Mamaloni camp gave clear
indications that power would not be
yielded easily; a catalogue of election
petitions was lodged in the High Court
and political horse-trading ensued. The
election petitions included one by
Mamaloni himself, challenging the
legality of Hilly's majority and that his
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election as prime minister was uncon-
stitutional (sv, Oct 1993). The High
Court settled in favor of Hilly. As if
this were not enough, Dennis Lulei,
leader of the Alliance Party in Parlia-
ment and new minister for education,
was terminated by the coalition leaders
for insurbordination after challenging
the government's leadership and deci-
sions. And Allan Paul resigned from
the Hilly government but later decided
to rejoin.
Despite these wrangles, things
seemed to be settling down as months
passed and most of the petitions to the
High Court failed, and the coalition's
position appeared much more secure.
Because of the nature of politics in
Solomon Islands, where allegiance can
change overnight, a former member of
the Government of National Unity,
Walter Folotalu, accepted the portfolio
left vacant by the withdrawal of Dennis
Lulei to become minister of education.
A successful petition against the mem-
ber for East Honiara, the Honourable
Charles Dausabea (a spokesman for
the Government of National Unity
group and a staunch supporter of Solo-
mon Mamaloni), alleging illegality of
voting practices, further strengthened
the coalition's position. At the end of
the year, it was again strengthened by
the approval of three additional minis-
tries during the December sitting of
Parliament, and the Mamaloni camp
seemed resigned to their defeat, if not
exhausted. All of these power struggles
took up a good six months, which the
government could have put to better
use in serving the country and its
people.
On the domestic front, the coalition
government's policies include a number
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of reforms as well as immediate and
long-term priorities. The immediate
goals include investigation into corrup-
tion, malpractice, and abuse of power;
establishment of a new national plan-
ning strategy; effective control and use
of government assets and utilities;
review of permanent secretaries;
review of the taxing regimes; review of
the provincial establishments; conven-
ing of economic, religious, and youth
summits; reengagement of doctors who
had earlier resigned; formulation of a
new foreign assistance policy; and
review and assessment of Solomon
Islands' overseas representation. A
ministerial consultative committee will
monitor the implementation of these
policies.
The long-term goals include self-
reliance, decentralization, and im-
provement of government services
around the country. The economic pol-
icy of the government is designed to
promote self-reliance. Importantly,
government assistance to rural areas is
guided by the principle of self-reliance
and is not viewed as a government
handout. The decentralization strategy
involves maximizing linkages to the
rural masses and requires the develop-
ment of a new decentralizing formula
to allow a more direct and meaningful
sharing of ideas, powers, and responsi-
bilities with traditional leaders and
resource owners (villagers who are
landowners) throughout the country.
Hilly's government recognizes the
importance of the resource owners to
the country and believes they should be
afforded maximum benefits from their
resources.
In support of its goal to improve
government services, the coalition gov-
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ernment hopes to improve and expand
health services and to implement an
open education policy that should
allow maximum access to schools.
The Hilly government places great
importance on state-church relations
and the need to strengthen this link.
The government has announced it will
provide assistance to the churches, for
example in the training of their leaders,
and will encourage the churches to take
an active role in linking the govern-
ment to the rural communities. The
government also sees the state and the
churches as the most important agen-
cies of development, and hopes that
close state-church relations will result
in greater participation by Solomon
Islanders in the political process.
The chief thrust of the new Solomon
Islands foreign policy can be character-
ized by the slogan, Friendship by Reci-
procity. Central to this approach is an
emphasis on the use of foreign assis-
tance for economic development. A
beginning will be made through recon-
ciliation with foreign governments.
Particular importance is attached to
Papua New Guinea, with whom pre-
vious relations had soured, especially
over the Bougainville crisis and the
spillover effects when three Solomon
Islanders were killed in September
1992. The coalition government pro-
duced a six-point initiative to aid in
resolving the Bougainville debacle: (I)
to normalize relations with Papua New
Guinea through dialogue rather than
confrontation; (2) to restore respect for
the laws, customs, and immigration
regulations of Solomon Islands that
have been violated since the beginning
of the border problem. The Bougain-
ville Humanitarian Office is to be
closed down and replaced with a peace
office. (3) to encourage the convening
of the proposed pan-Bougainville lead-
ers' conference as a necessary avenue
for a meeting of minds from the differ-
ent sides on Bougainville; (4) to restore
normal services on the Solomons side
of the border, including immigration
and customs control; (5) to establish an
honorary consulate in Port Moresby as
a center for bilateral discussions
between Solomon Islands and Papua
New Guinea. This office will also cater
for the interests of Solomon Islanders
living in Papua New Guinea. (6) to
work toward the establishment of a
proper border treaty with Papua New
Guinea (5N, July-Aug 1993).
Beside the attempt to restore Papua
New Guinea-Solomon Islands rela-
tions, especially with an eye to working
together to resolve the Bougainville cri-
sis, the government has also pledged to
increase dialogue with regional and
global friends in order to renew friend-
ship and gain respect and support. A
new foreign policy paper will be intro-
duced to iay the foundation for further-
ing Solomon Islands' image and integ-
rity overseas, and relations with all
overseas donors will be improved.
After taking office, the government
decided to slowly phase out logging, to
encourage local processing of logs, and
to conserve forest resources. To effect
its policy on timber and forest re-
sources, the coalition would place a
moratorium on the granting of licenses
to logging companies, effective early in
1994 (55, July 1993). A lot had gone
wrong with forest exploitation in the
country. For instance, the permanent
secretary for the Ministry of Natural
Resources had revealed that the coun-
POLITICAL REVIEWS
try was losing SI$15 million a year from
underpricing of its timber exports.
Companies operating in the Solomons
achieved this through collaboration
with overseas companies. Not only did
landowners lose money, but the gov-
ernment also lost revenue because of
undertaxation. For example, the gov-
ernment had to ask Kalena Timber
Company to pay SI$900,000 in under-
stated duties and royalties (sv, April
1993). In other cases, many of the
Asian companies operating in the
country did not follow the legal proce-
dures required by the Forest Resource
and Timber Utilization Act. Some were
operating on lands not covered by their
permits and licenses (ss, Jan 1993).
Other coalition government policies
are influenced by cost-containment
measures. Soon after the new govern-
ment took office, it decided to suspend
construction of the new State House,
contracted to be built for SI$15 million,
which it claimed would be a burden on
the government's purse. Individuals or
companies adversely affected would be
compensated accordingly. The perma-
nent secretary positions that had been
contracted out by the Mamaloni gov-
ernment were revoked in October (ss,
Oct 1993) and were reestablished under
the normal public service employment
structure. For the new positions, sixty-
seven applicants vied for fifteen vacan-
cies. Most of the former permanent
secretaries were rehired, with only four
of them unsuccessful. Permanent secre-
tary salaries, placed on a permanent
basis instead of contractual employ~
ment, were reduced from sl$60,000 to
$43,000 a year (ss, Oct 1993).
The proposed Melanesian Trade
Bloc, whose objective is to improve the
economies and trade of member coun-
tries, is expected to be an economic
milestone in the relations between the
member countries of the Melanesian
Spearhead Group. Each country will
export products in which they have a
competitive advantage. The countries
presently involved are Papua New
Guinea, Vanuatu, and Solomon
Islands, but others such as Fiji and
Kanaky (New Caledonia) could be
included if they wished. Under such an
arrangement, Vanuatu beef could be
exported to Solomons and Papua New
Guinea; Solomons tuna to Papua New
Guinea and Vanuatu, and so on.
In education, the World Bank ap-
proved us$16.9 million (approximately
SI$52 million) for the construction of
more secondary schools in the country.
The Implementation Project Unit in the
Ministry of Education is to be respon-
sible for the different phases of the pro-
ject. The process will be slow and cau-
tious to avoid the misappropriation of
funds or bungling of contracts that
happened with an earlier World Bank
project in the mid-1980s. The Honiara
Town Council established an innova-
tive program to absorb Standard 6
dropouts so that they can be taught the
basic skills they will need in the work-
place. Essentially, middle schools will
provide an alternative avenue for these
students; it has yet to be decided
whether these schools will form a
bridge to get the students back into the
main stream of schooling, toward
advanced studies.
The long-running dispute between
the national doctors and the govern-
ment finally came to an end in Octo-
ber. Prime Minister Hilly personally
invited the doctors to discuss the condi-
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tions of the new contract with him. Dr
Quan, a spokesperson for the doctors,
later informed S%man Voice that they
were happy with the new contract,
which if implemented would for the
first time place them among the most
highly paid professionals in the country
(5V, Sept 1993). With an improved pay
package of between 51$30,000 and
$60,000 (5N, April-May 1993), the
doctors were required to take up the
new offer and resume work no later
than 29 October (55, Oct 1993).
In March, history was made when
John Muria became the first indige-
nous chief justice of the Solomons.
From Guadalcanal, Muria was edu-
cated at the Catholic St Joseph's Sec-
ondary School in Honiara and the Uni-
versity of Papua New Guinea, from
which he graduated in law in 1979. He
had worked for a short time in Papua
New Guinea and was a public solicitor
in Honiara before his appointment. He
is 37 years old and married with three
children.
A well-known anthropologist who
did extensive work among the Kwaio
people on Malaita, Professor Roger
Keesing, died on 7 May during an aca-
demic meeting in Toronto. His ashes
were taken to the Solomons by his
partner, Christine Jourdan, and his
children and buried at Ngarinasuru,
Malaita (55, Aug 1993).
In September, the Solomon Brewery
was officially opened by Governor
General Sir George Lepping. The
brewery is owned partly by the Ger-
man company Brachaus and partly by
Nauruan interests. Dignitaries from
Nauru, Brachaus, and the government
were present at the official opening cer-
emony (55, Sept 1993).
In line with the emphasis on state-
church relations, Provincial Premier
Mathias Ramoni of Makira encour-
aged the churches to establish schools
in his province. Speaking during cele-
brations of the tenth anniversary of the
province, the Honourable Ramoni
commended the Anglican, Catholic,
South Seas Evangelical, and Seventh
Day Adventist Churches for running
the schools in the province. In addition
to the primary schools, the churches
operate some vocational and pre-theo-
logical colleges, an example being the
Stuvenberg Rural Training Centre in
East Makira. The South Seas Evangeli-
cal Church proposed to establish a sec-
ondary school. The premier highly
commended this kind of initiative (55,
Oct 1993).
The Tourist Authority collaborated
eagerly with Dr Robert Ballard of the
United States National Geographic
Society on his book, The Lost Ships of
Guada/cana/, in the hope of finding out
whether Iron Bottom Sound (a major
Second World War battle site) might
eventually become a vast underwater
museum. As the general manager of the
Tourist Authority predicted, "We are
sitting on a gold mine if only we can
turn technology and vision to Solomon
Islands' advantage." He was very opti-
mistic: "The international exposure for
us is priceless. This is right next to
Honiara and suddenly Dr Ballard is
putting us on the world map" (5V, Oct
1993)·
Overall, the political wranglings
and delayed implementation of the new
policies of the Hilly government, which
are innovative and pragmatic in many
ways, made the overall achievements
of the country seem slow and few. But
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given the complexity of the country
and the many hurdles the new govern-
ment had to overcome, 1993 may be
regarded as a year of preparation for
the Hilly government to start with a
clean slate in 1994.
JOHN MOFFAT FUGUI
MIKE WATE
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VANUATU
Maxime Carlot Korman's government
retained office during 1993, despite ten-
sions between the coalition partners,
Korman's Union of Moderate Parties
(UMP) and the National United Party
(NUP). These tensions, combined with
those within the coalition parties,
repeatedly distracted attention from
problems of economic management
and development.
Prime Minister Korman began the
year with a ministerial reshuffle, the
first since his government took office in
December 1991, intended to consoli-
date his position and to rein in two
ministers whose conduct had been
capricious. Korman took over the for-
eign affairs portfolio from his leading
rival within the Union of Moderate
Parties, Serge Vohor, shifting him to
the new post of minister for eco-
nomic affairs. He made his move
while Vohor was on an official visit
to Noumea. He retained Willie Jimmy
.as minister for finance, but reduced
his responsibilities by transferring
external trade to the new economic
affairs ministry (PR, Jan 1993; VW,
9 Jan 1993, I).
In the course of the year Korman
carried forward his foreign affairs
responsibilities with reasonable suc-
cess. He consolidated relations with
France, and developed links with New
Caledonia, including by opening a con-
sulate in Noumea in April. But France
maintained a relatively cautious
approach, notwithstanding the hopes
of some UMP supporters, and the fears
of some critics of the French presence
in the region, and despite the return to
power of the conservatives in the
French elections in March. Korman
and his government also maintained
harmonious relations with Australia,
Vanuatu's leading aid donor, avoiding
a recurrence of the tensions that had
twice arisen in 1992 (Fry 1993, 396, 399;
Henningham 1993, 427). Australia's
Minister for Development Assistance
and the Pacific Islands' Gordon Bilney
visited Vanuatu in June and described
bilateral relations as "good and
improving" (vw, 19 June 1993, 5). In
addition, the Korman government
sought to develop and consolidate
Vanuatu's external relations more
widely, with some success.
If Vanuatu's external relations were
generally constructive and serene dur-
ing 1993, this was not true of domestic
affairs. Walter Lini's National United
Party proved anything but united. Its
internal problems had unsettling effects
on the governing coalition, as did ten-
sions between anglophone-educated
and francophone-educated ni-
Vanuatu. During the course of the year
Lini repeatedly demanded that Korman
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dismiss from the ministry two NUP
members, Onneyn Tahi and Edward
Tabisari. The party had earlier sus-
pended and disciplined these men fol-
lowing disputes, involving allegations
and counter-allegations of corruption,
between them and Lini and his close
business associate, Dinh Van Than, the
NUP general secretary (vw, 17 July
1993, I).
By mid-1993 Lini, who hitherto had
played a low-key role as an ordinary
member of the governing coalition,
despite his position as NUP president,
was demanding the posts of minister
for justice and deputy prime minister.
Lini again wished to playa central role
in the government of Vanuatu, instead
of implementing an earlier understand-
ing that he would take up the post of
president after Fred Timakata steps
down in early 1994. In addition, he
apparently wished to gain authority
over Chief Justice Charles Vaudin
d'Imecourt, who had recently found
Mrs Goiset-the sister of Lini's associ-
ate, Dinh-guilty of business malprac-
tice. While the court case was under
way, Lini had written to President
Timakata urging Imecourt's dismissal,
on the grounds that he had acted
against the interests of justice in several
recent cases (vw, 28 Aug 1993, I; PR, 27
Sept 1993, 2).
Tensions within the governing coali-
tion began to come to a head on 10
August, when four francophone civil
servants were suspended from the Min-
istry of Health, apparently in retalia-
tion for the politically motivated sus-
pension the week before of four
anglophone civil servants from minis-
tries controlled by UMP members (vw,
14 Aug 1993, I). Prime Minister Kor-
man responded by dismissing Hilda
Lini from the post of health minister
(vw, 21 Aug 1993, I). Ms Lini, a sister
of Walter Lini, is a prominent public
figure in her own right; later in the year
she was awarded the Sean McBride
International Peace Prize in recognition
of her years of anticolonial and antinu-
clear campaigning (PIM, Dec 1993,27).
In early September Korman dismissed
Police Commissioner Sato Kilman,
contending that he had failed to keep
him informed of police and security
matters (PR, 13 Sept 1993,6). Critics of
the government complained that the
morale and efficiency of the public ser-
vice were being eroded by politically
motivated sackings.
Following Hilda Lini's dismissal,
Walter Lini withdrew the support of
the National United Party from the
governing coalition. But whereas Lini
was followed by six party parliamen-
tarians, four others, including Tahi and
Tabisari and headed by Justice Minis-
ter Sethy Regenvanu,remained with
the coalition. Following the appoint-
ment of the speaker of the house, Kor-
man was able to retain a slim parlia-
mentary majority of 23 to 22. In
mid-September Korman increased his
majority to three by persuading a mem-
ber of the opposition Vanua'aku Pati,
Thomas Faratia, to shift allegiance to
the Union of Moderate Parties in
return for a ministry (vw, 18 Sept 1993,
I). A few days later Lini made a deal
with Economic Affairs Minister Vohor
that would have brought Lini and his
supporters into the government at the
expense of the Regenvanu group. But
the deal, which attracted criticism from
some senior UMP figures, had been con-
cluded following Korman's departure
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on a visit to Asia and the United States,
and he revoked it on his return (PR, 27
Sept 1993).
Until her portfolio was withdrawn,
Hilda Lini had been the only woman in
the ministry; she was one of the first
two women members elected to the
forty-six-member parliament in
November 1987, and was reelected in
1991. Women continue to play only a
limited part in public affairs in
Vanuatu, and hold few senior posi-
tions, whether in the public or the pri-
vate sector. In early February, nonethe-
less, Ms Rita Naviti was sworn in as
Vanuatu's first woman magistrate (vw,
6 Feb 1993, I). Attitudes to women
.came under scrutiny in August, when
Le Flamingo night club held Vanuatu's
first beauty contest. The government
had given its assent, but the National
Council of Chiefs, the Vanuatu Chris-
tian Council, the Vanuatu National
Council of Women, the Port Vila
Women's Centre, and other groups
denounced the contest, claiming it was
demeaning to women and inconsistent
with the traditions and values of
Vanuatu (VW, 18 Sept 1993, 4, 5; Wom-
en's News, Oct 1993, II).
In the final months of the year the
Korman government was still in
power, but its future looked uncertain.
The economy remained sluggish, with
increased tourist arrivals and reason-
able returns from the finance center
offset by poor commodity prices (see
PIM, May and July 1993). During the
1991 election campaign the Union of
Moderate Parties had promised copra
growers generous price support
arrangements. By the end of 1993 it
seemed clear that the government
would not have the funds to meet this
commitment (PIM, Nov 1993, 20).
Vanuatu's public servants struck for
several weeks from 24 November,
demanding a 16 percent pay rise to
compensate for the erosion of their sal-
aries by inflation over the previous four
years. The government responded by
offering 5 percent, but warned that it
planned to shed two hundred public
service positions in early 1994, as an
economy measure and to reduce over-
staffing. Further industrial trouble
seemed likely (PR, 20 Dec 1993).
Meanwhile controversy had arisen
over alleged corruption, abuses of jus-
tice, and environmental risks asso-
ciated with large-scale logging projects.
Critics of the government complained
that an established logging concern had
been squeezed out in favor of a Malay-
sian company. The Malaysian com-
pany had been permitted to pay a
much-reduced reafforestation fee and
had been granted permission to log
70,000 cubic meters per year, whereas
previously the annual limit per com-
pany had been 5000 cubic meters. For-
merly, the total annual cut had been
less than 25,000 cubic meters, the
amount regarded by forestry experts as
the maximum allowable under sustain-
able development guidelines (PR, 9
Aug, 13 Sept, 27 Sept, and 25 Oct 1993;
PIM, Oct 1993,14,15).
Critics complained that, like its
predecessors, the government was
restricting the freedom of the press.
They also cited poor financial manage-
ment, especially with respect to an
arrangement made by Finance Minister
Jimmy. Under this scheme Vanuatu,
working through an Australian inter-
mediary, would open a line of credit,
reportedly for up to US$2 billion, for
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infrastructure and development pro-
jects. Vanuatu's recurrent budget is
about us$so million (PR, 9 Aug 1993;
PIM, Oct 1993,13; Nov 1993, 20).
At a regional ministerial meeting on
population and sustainable develop-
ment held in Port Vila in early Septem-
ber, Prime Minister Korman warned
that Vanuatu was heading for disaster
unless current population and develop-
ment trends were reversed (vw, II Sept
1993, I). Unfortunately, the govern-
ment, although aware of the looming
problems faced by Vanuatu, has yet to
develop and implement effective poli-
cies in response.
STEPHEN HENNINGHAM
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